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ABSTRACT 
Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application to the Economics of 
Alliances  
by Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson * 
This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which 
one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, 
against two separate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, 
players 1 and 2 have the opportunity to form an alliance to share their 
endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops, military hardware, 
money). This paper examines „non-cooperative“ alliances in which only 
individually rational ex ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these 
transfers take place, each alliance member maximizes his payoff in his 
respective Colonel Blotto game, given his resource constraint and player A's 
allocation of its endowment across the two games. No ex post transfers are 
enforceable. Remarkably, there are several ranges of parameters in which 
endogenous unilateral transfers take place within the alliance. That is, one 
player gives away resources to his ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral 
transfers arise because they lead to a strategic shift in the common opponent's 
force allocation away from the set of battlefields of the player making the 
transfer, towards the set of battlefields of the player receiving the transfer. Our 
result demonstrates that there exist unilateral transfers for which the 
combination of direct and strategic effects benefits both allies. This stands in 
stark contrast to the previous literature on alliances (see Sandler and Hartley, 
2001), which relies on the assumption of pure or impure public goods. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
"Colonel Blotto"-Koalitionsspiele mit Anwendung auf die ökonomische 
Theorie von Allianzen 
Diese Arbeit analysiert "Colonel Blotto"-Spiele mit mehr als zwei Spielern, die 
an mindestens zwei Fronten miteinander kämpfen. Spieler A kämpft gleichzeitig 
in zwei "Colonel Blotto"-Spielen mit zwei verschiedenen Kontrahenten, B1 und 
B2. Die Kontrahenten können vor der eigentlichen Konfliktphase eine Allianz 
eingehen. Das erlaubt es ihnen ihre Mengen an einer homogenen Konflikt-
ressource (Truppen, Waffen, Geld) untereinander zu transferieren. Das Papier 
untersucht dabei „nicht-kooperative“ Allianzen. Darunter wird verstanden, dass 
der Einsatz der transferierten Ressourcen auf den jeweiligen Konfliktschau-
plätzen von dem jeweiligen Spieler B1 bzw. B2 in seinem eigenen Interesse 
eingesetzt wird und Seitenzahlungen im Anschluss an die Konfliktphase 
ausgeschlossen sind. Es zeigt sich, dass es dennoch zu einseitigen und 
freiwilligen Ressourcentransfers der Spieler B1 und B2 im Vorfeld des Konflikts 
kommen kann, dass also beispielsweise B1 an B2 z.B. Waffen liefert, B2 diese 
als Geschenk akzeptiert und sich beide, B1 und B2 besser stellen. Ursache für 
die Besserstellung ist der strategische Effekt solcher Transfers auf das 
Kampfverhalten von A, der seine Kampfkraft vom Kampfgeschehen mit B1 zum 
Kampfgeschehen mit B2 verlagert. Das Ergebnis widerspricht den früheren 
Ergebnissen zu Allianzen (vgl. Sandler und Hartley, 2001), das im Kontext der 
privaten Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter erzielt wurde.  
2Abstract This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which
one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two sep-
arate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity
to form an alliance to share their endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops,
military hardware, money). This paper examines “non-cooperative” alliances in which only
individually rational ex ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these transfers take
place, each alliance member maximizes his payoff in his respective Colonel Blotto game, given
his resource constraint and player A’s allocation of its endowment across the two games. No
ex post transfers are enforceable. Remarkably, there are several ranges of parameters in which
endogenous unilateral transfers take place within the alliance. That is, one player gives away
resources to his ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral transfers arise because they lead to
a strategic shift in the common opponent’s force allocation away from the set of battlefields of
the player making the transfer, towards the set of battlefields of the player receiving the transfer.
Our result demonstrates that there exist unilateral transfers for which the combination of direct
and strategic effects benefits both allies. This stands in stark contrast to the previous literature
on alliances (see Sandler and Hartley, 2001), which relies on the assumption of pure or impure
public goods.
1 Introduction
This paper examines a multi-player, multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which one player, A, si-
multaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two separate opponents,
1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity to form an
alliance to share their endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops, military hard-
ware, money). Our focus is on non-cooperative alliances in which only individually rational ex
ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these transfers take place, player A optimally
responds in allocating his resource endowment across the two games and then players play their
respective Colonel Blotto games given their resource constraints. No ex post transfers between
the two alliance members are enforceable. We call such an alliance a self–enforcing alliance
without commitment.
The main result of this paper is to show that there is a wide range of parameters in which en-
dogenous unilateral transfers take place within such an alliance. That is, one player gives away
resources to its ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral transfers arise because they lead
to a strategic shift in the common opponent’s force allocation away from the set of battlefields
common to the player making the transfer, towards the set of battlefields common to the player
receiving the transfer. Our result demonstrates that there exist unilateral transfers for which the
combination of the direct and strategic effects benefits both allies.
3Our approach contrasts with the major focus of the literature on the economics of alliances,
dating back to Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), (for a summary, see Sandler
and Hartley, 2001). This literature generally assumes that the resource employed by allies is
a (possibly impure) public good.1 In these models, one player’s resource allocation provides
direct non-rival, non-excludable benefits to an allied player.2 In our model, resource expendi-
ture by an ally is completely rival and excludable. However, through its effects on the strategic
choices of the enemy, strategic externalities may be created. These externalities may suffice to
generate endogenous unilateral transfers in strategic alliances without the a priori assumption
of pure or impure public goods and without commitment.
Our model appears to provide potential insight into the behavior of alliances in historical
military conflicts. For instance, it seems capable of explaining the assistance that the United
States provided to the Soviet Union in The Second World War through the Lend-Lease Act of
1941. Estimates of these transfers vary, ranging from $9 billion to $11 billion for the four-year
period after Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Historical accounts of this
program lend some support for the view that this assistance was extended with no expectation
of repayment.3
Despite its significant departure from the assumptions of the public goods-based literature
on alliances, our model also obtains results consistent with one prominent conjecture in that
literature, Olson’s (1965) “exploitation hypothesis.” This hypothesis asserts that larger nations
will bear a disproportionately higher share of the common cost of an alliance relative to its
benefits. In our model, a self–enforcing alliance without commitment arises involving unilateral
transfers from player i to player j when player i has a larger resource endowment and the ratio
of player i’s endowment to player j’s endowment is sufficiently greater than the ratio of the
total values of the battlefields in the two players’ respective Colonel Blotto games. When such
alliances arise, transfers flow from the player who is resource rich to the player who is resource
1 In Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) alliance expenditure was treated as a
pure public good. Extensions to impure public good expenditure, known as the “joint product
model” originate with Van Ypersele De Strihou (1967). See also Sandler and Cauley (1975),
Sandler (1977), and Murdoch and Sandler (1982, 1984).
2 In the early contributions to this literature it was standard to focus solely on the game be-
tween alliance members and take the enemy’s expenditure as given. Exceptions to this approach
include Linster (1993) and Skaperdas (1998), who examine the formation of alliances in con-
tests in which the probability of winning a prize is represented by a contest success function
and the expenditure of each alliance member serves as a (possibly impure) public good in that
it directly increases the expected payoffs of other alliance members for a given enemy expen-
diture.
3 See for instance, Herring (1973, p.38).
4poor. The degree of asymmetry in resource endowments necessary to generate a self–enforcing
alliance without commitment depends not only on the relative aggregate values of the players’
respective battlefields, but also on the absolute magnitudes of the two players’ endowments
relative to that of player A.
Section 2 introduces our three stage game. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium in the final
stage of the game, which consists of a multi-player, multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which
one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two sep-
arate opponents, 1 and 2. This section provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium
univariate marginal distributions and payoffs of the component Colonel Blotto games for ar-
bitrary budget constraints and any number of battlefields n ≥ 3. The resource endowments in
this final stage are determined by choices made in the first two stages. These two stages are
examined in Section 4. In the first stage, conditional on their endowments, players 1 and 2 de-
cide on whether to transfer resources, with any positive net transfer generating a self–enforcing
alliance without commitment. In the second stage, player A decides upon an allocation of its
resources across the two Blotto games, contingent on the choices of players 1 and 2. Section
4 shows that self–enforcing alliances without commitment may indeed occur and characterizes
both the range of parameter values for which they arise and the nature of transfers in such
alliances. Section 5 compares the range of parameters for which positive transfers arise in self–
enforcing alliances without commitment to the range for which positive individually rational
ex ante transfers would arise between players 1 and 2 when complete and binding contingent
commitments may be made as to the ex post division of payoffs. We call alliances in which
such commitments can be made alliances with complete commitment. Section 6 concludes and
outlines extensions.
2 The Coalitional Colonel Blotto Game
Players
There are 3 players, {A,1,2}, and two simultaneous Colonel Blotto games, G1 and G2. Player
A competes in both of the Colonel Blotto games, G1 and G2. Each player i ∈ 1,2 competes in
only one Colonel Blotto game, Gi (see the schematic in Figure 1). The Colonel Blotto game
Gi has ni battlefields, and we will assume that ni ≥ 3, i = 1,2.4 Each battlefield j ∈ {1, . . . ,ni}
in Colonel Blotto game Gi has a payoff of vi > 0. The total value of Colonel Blotto game Gi,
nivi, is denoted by φi ≡ nivi. The force allocated to each battlefield in each Colonel Blotto game
must be nonnegative and each player i∈ A∪{1,2} has a normalized budget of Xi, where player
4 Moving from ni = 2 to ni ≥ 3 greatly enlarges the space of feasible n-variate distribution
functions, and the equilibrium strategies examined in this paper require that ni ≥ 3.
5A’s normalized budget is XA = 1. On each battlefield the player that allocates the higher level
of force wins that battlefield. In the case that the players allocate the same level of force on a
given battlefield, the player that has the higher level of resources in that Colonel Blotto game
wins that battlefield. The specification of the tie-breaking rule does not affect the results as
long as no player has less than 2
ni
times the forces of their opponent in Colonel Blotto game
Gi, i = 1,2. In the case that this condition does apply this specification of the tie-breaking rule
avoids the need to have the stronger player allocate a level of force that is arbitrarily close to,
but above, the weaker player’s maximal allocation of force. A range of tie-breaking rules yield
similar results.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Alliances
In the first stage of the game players 1 and 2 choose whether or not to form an alliance. We
focus on the case in which it is not possible for players 1 and 2 to a priori commit to a divi-
sion rule for the alliance’s ex post payoff. In this case each alliance member, conditional on the
resources that are available, maximizes the payoff from their individual Colonel Blotto game.
To emphasize the point that unilateral transfers between allies may take place in the absence
of pure or impure public goods, we assume that neither player’s payoff depends on the even-
tual outcome of his ally’s game. However, prior to the play of their respective games, alliance
members may reallocate resources among themselves subject to the constraint that the resulting
allocation of resources is individually rational for each alliance member.
Since there are many game forms that might govern how mutually beneficial transfers might
take place, we instead focus on the following simple question: When does there exist a nonzero
and feasible5 net transfer, t, from player 1 to player 2 (negative t corresponds to a positive net
transfer from 2 to 1) that strictly increases both allies’ payoffs when compared to the case in
which t = 0. In examining this question, we assume that following any choice of t the game
that follows is one in which player A observes the resulting budget constraints, X t1 ≡ X1 − t
and X t2 ≡ X2 + t, takes them as given, and then responds optimally in allocating XA across G1
and G2. We label the resulting allocations of XA across G1 and G2 by XA1 and XA2, respec-
tively. Once the budgets (X t1,X t2,XA1,XA2) are determined, they become common knowledge
and the corresponding complete information simultaneous move Colonel Blotto games G1 and
G2 are played. If such Pareto improving transfers between players 1 and 2 exist, it is reasonable
to assume that the allies, in this environment of complete information, can implement some
5 Feasibility in this context means that the transfer lies in the interval [−X2,X1].
6such transfer.6 When nonzero transfers between players 1 and 2 exist that are strictly Pareto
improving, we refer to the alliance as a self–enforcing alliance without commitment.
Before examining this game in more detail, it is important to note that one immediate re-
sult of Roberson’s (2006) characterization of equilibrium payoffs in Colonel Blotto games with
asymmetric budgets is that, for a given opposition budget constraint, a player’s payoff is non-
decreasing in his own budget. Hence, if player A’s allocation of his budget over the two games
Gi, i = 1,2, cannot be adjusted in response to transfers, as would be the case if A’s allocation
of XA across the two games preceded or was simultaneous with the transfer between players 1
and 2, neither player could possibly strictly benefit from a transfer of resources to his ally.
In the analysis that follows, let pi ti denote the payoff of the Colonel Blotto game Gi to player
i = 1,2 if a self–enforcing alliance without commitment is formed with net transfer from 1
to 2 equal to t, and pi0i , denote the payoff to player i = 1,2 from acting in isolation, with
no transfer taking place. By definition, a self–enforcing alliance without commitment forms if
and only if pi ti > pi0i for some t 6= 0 for each i = 1,2. Thus, a self–enforcing alliance without
commitment forms if and only if there exists a reallocation of the alliance members’ budgets
such that each player i = 1,2 strictly prefers this to competing with his own endowment, given
the corresponding optimal responses of A in allocating his resources.
Before defining the players’ strategies, it is useful to motivate the leadership role the alliance
takes in determining transfers. As noted above, if player A cannot condition the allocation of
his budget on the available budgets of the alliance members, the private good nature of the
expenditure of players 1 and 2 insures that no transfers take place between the two players.
However, if A has an opportunity to condition his allocation upon the alliance transfers, a pos-
itive transfer from one player to the other may induce a sufficient shift in the optimal budget
allocations of player A away from the transferring player’s Colonel Blotto game to more than
compensate the player for making the positive net transfer. That is, the strategic effect may
more than compensate for the direct effect of the transfer for one player, while the direct effect
more than compensates for the strategic effect for the other.
Why might it be reasonable to assume that A can condition his allocation across fronts on the
transfers of the allies? One reason is that it seems plausible to believe that transfers between
6 Naturally, there are many game forms that might govern the implementation of transfers of
the one-dimensional resource between the two allies. For instance, in one version of such a
game each ally simultaneously decides upon a nonnegative amount to transfer to its ally. Each
ally then observes these amounts and then the allies simultaneously decide whether to accept or
reject the offer of its ally. It is straightforward to show that when nonzero transfers exist which
are Pareto improving, this offer process can implement one such transfer, the transfer in which
the ally making the Pareto improving positive net transfer obtains his most preferred positive
net transfer.
7alliance members are more easily observed than transfers between different Colonel Blotto
games by player A. After all, alliance members are different players and reaching agreements to
transfer material between players may take longer than solving an individual allocation problem
and may involve a public announcement. Moreover, as in the case with the Allies fighting Nazi
Germany in The Second World War, it may be the case that the two Colonel Blotto games G1
and G2 represent two distinct geographically separate fronts in a war and country A can transfer
resources between these fronts within the confines of the geographical area that it controls.
Finally, the notion of the transfer of resources as a commitment seems more reasonable in the
context of a Pareto improving transfer across players than as a shifting of resources controlled
by a single player. Any attempt to undo such a commitment would require the compliance and
coordination of two decision makers, not just the command of one.
Strategies
Let XA1 and XA2 = 1−XA1 be player A’s resources allocated to the Colonel Blotto games G1
and G2, respectively, and X ti be player i’s, i = 1,2, level of resources utilized in Gi after a
transfer t is implemented. Each distinct pair of games (G1(X t1,XA1),G2(X t2,XA2)) represents a
distinct final stage subgame of the overall game. In the final stage, it is well known that for
a given i ∈ {1,2}, if either 1
ni
XAi < X ti ≤ XAi or
1
ni
X ti < XAi ≤ X ti there exists no pure strategy
equilibrium in the final stage Colonel Blotto game Gi.7
For each player i ∈ 1,2 a mixed strategy in Gi, which we label a distribution of force for
player i, is an ni-variate distribution function Pi : Rni+ → [0,1] with support contained in the set
of player i’s feasible allocations of force, Xi = {x ∈ Rni+|∑nij=1 x j ≤ X ti }, and with a set of uni-
variate marginal distribution functions {F ji }
ni
j=1, one univariate marginal distribution function
for each battlefield in player i’s Colonel Blotto game Gi. The ni-tuple of player i’s allocation of
force across their ni battlefields is a random ni-tuple drawn from the ni-variate distribution Pi
with the set of univariate marginal distribution functions {F ji }
ni
j=1. Player A’s mixed strategy,
a distribution of force for player A, is a set compromised of an n1-variate distribution func-
tion PA1 : Rn1+ → [0,1] and an n2-variate distribution function PA2 : R
n2
+ → [0,1]. Each of the
ni-variate distributions PAi has support contained in XAi = {x ∈ Rni+|∑nij=1 x j ≤ XAi} and has
a set of univariate marginal distribution functions {F jAi}
ni
j=1, one univariate marginal distribu-
tion function for each battlefield in the Colonel Blotto game Gi. For each Colonel Blotto game
Gi, the ni-tuple of player A’s allocation of force across the ni battlefields is a random ni-tuple
7 In the cases where 1
ni
XAi ≥ X ti or
1
ni
X ti ≥ XAi there, trivially, exists a pure strategy equilibrium
in the game Gi and the player with the higher level of resources in that game wins all of the
battlefields.
8drawn from the ni-variate distribution PAi with the set of univariate marginal distribution func-
tions {F jAi}
ni
j=1.
Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games
The Coalitional Colonel Blotto Game, which we label
Γ {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2} ,
is the multistage game in which players 1 and 2 first implement a feasible net transfer of
resources between themselves, player A then observes this transfer and allocates his budget
XA(= 1) across the two Colonel Blotto games G1 and G2, and then players 1 and 2 individually
compete with player A in their respective Colonel Blotto games by simultaneously announcing
distributions of forces to their respective battlefields, subject to their respective budget con-
straints determined in the previous stages. In the games G1 and G2 each battlefield is won by
the player that provides the higher allocation of force to that battlefield (subject to the tie break-
ing rules discussed above), and each player’s payoff equals the expected value of all battlefields
won.
3 The Final Stage Colonel Blotto Games
We start our analysis with the final stage subgames Gi, i = 1,2, and work our way back through
the game tree. Theorem 1 summarizes Roberson’s (2006) characterization of equilibrium in
the Colonel Blotto game. To simplify the exposition we adopt the following notation: let X i =
max{XAi,X ti } and X i = min{XAi,X ti } for i = 1,2.
Theorem 1 (Roberson (2006))
A. Suppose X i and X i satisfy 2ni ≤
X i
X i
≤ 1, then the unique Nash equilibrium univariate marginal
distribution functions of the final stage Colonel Blotto game Gi in the game Γ {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2}
are as follows:
For the player with X i forces, denoted as player k,
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,ni} F jk (x) =
(
1− X iX i
)
+ x2
ni
X i
X i
X i
x ∈
[
0, 2
ni
X i
]
Similarly for the player with X i forces, denoted as player −k,
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,ni} F j−k (x) = x2
ni
X i
x ∈
[
0, 2
ni
X i
]
9Moreover, in any Nash equilibrium the expected payoff for player k is φi
(
X i
2X i
)
and the expected
payoff for player −k is φi
(
1− X i2X i
)
.
8
B. Suppose X i and X i satisfy 1ni−1 ≤
X i
X i
< 2
ni
, then the unique Nash equilibrium univariate
marginal distribution functions of the final stage Colonel Blotto game Gi in the game
Γ {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2} are as follows:
For the player with X i forces, denoted as player k,
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,ni} F jk (x) =
(
1− 2
ni
)
+ xX i
2
ni
x ∈ [0,X i]
Similarly for player with X i forces, denoted as player −k,
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,ni} F j−k (x) =


2x
(
X i−
Xi
ni
)
(X i)
2 x ∈ [0,X i)
1 x ≥ X i
In any Nash equilibrium the expected payoff for player k is φi
(
2
ni
− 2X i
n2i X i
)
and the expected
payoff for player −k is φi
(
1− 2
ni
+ 2X i
n2i X i
)
.
C. Suppose X i and X i satisfy 1ni <
X i
X i
< 1
ni−1 . Define m =
⌈
X i
X i−X i(ni−1)
⌉
, and note that 2≤m < ∞.
A pair of Nash equilibrium ni-variate distributions of the final stage Colonel Blotto game Gi in
the game Γ {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2} are as follows:
The player with X i forces, denoted player k, randomly allocates 0 forces to ni−2 battlefields.
On the remaining 2 battlefields player k utilizes a bivariate distribution that has m mass points
and each mass point receives the same weight, 1
m
. Player k’s mass points on the 2 remaining
battlefields are located at the points(
(m−1− j) X i
m−1
, j X i
m−1
)
, j = 0, . . . ,m−1.
Player −k, randomly allocates X i forces to n− 2 battlefields. On the remaining 2 battlefields
player −k utilizes a bivariate distribution that has m mass points and each mass point receives
the same weight, 1
m
. Player −k’s mass points on the 2 remaining battlefields are located at(
X i− j
niX i−X i
m−1
,X i− (m−1− j)
niX i−X i
m−1
)
, j = 0, . . . ,m−1.
In any Nash equilibrium the expected payoff for player k is φi
(
2m−2
mn2i
)
, and the expected
payoff for player −k is φi
(
1− 2m−2
mn2i
)
.
8 The final stage games G1 and G2 are constant-sum games. Consequently, any Nash equilib-
rium strategies derived are also optimal strategies and the corresponding payoffs are security
level payoffs.
10
For a proof of Theorem 1 see Roberson (2006). A major part of this proof is establishing the ex-
istence of ni-variate distributions with the given univariate marginal distribution functions and
with supports contained in {x ∈ Rni+|∑nij=1 x j = X i} and {x ∈ Rni+|∑nij=1 x j = X i} respectively.
Note that uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs follows immediately from the fact that the fi-
nal stage Colonel Blotto games are constant–sum. These payoffs are illustrated in Figure 2 as a
function of X iX i . A salient feature of this characterization is that as the number of battlefields, ni,
becomes large, the ranges of X iX i covered by (B) and (C) of Theorem 1 collapse to zero, and the
weaker player’s payoff (in these ranges) goes to zero as well. We use these facts in the analysis
of the second stage game that follows.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
4 Stages One and Two: Alliances and Resource Allocations
We begin in stage two with player A’s optimal allocation of resources between the two Colonel
Blotto games. The primitives in this section are the payoffs derived in the previous section.
Given the above characterization, it follows that the form of player A’s payoff function de-
pends critically on the transfer of resources between players 1 and 2 in the first period. In fact
for player A there are 64 different regions each with a distinct form for the payoff function.
These regions correspond to the cases where either X
t
i
XAi or
XAi
X ti
, i = 1,2, satisfy one of the three
conditions of Theorem 1, or one player has more than ni times the budget of the other in Gi.
For example, assume that XA = 1 > X t1 +X t2. If player A divides his resources between the
two Colonel Blotto games such that 2
n1
≤
X t1
XA1 ≤ 1 and
2
n2
≤
X t2
XA2 ≤ 1 then player A’s payoff
function is:
piA
({
XAi,X ti
}
i=1,2
)
= φ1
(
1−
X t1
2XA1
)
+φ2
(
1−
X t2
2XA2
)
.
The payoff functions for the remaining regions are similarly constructed.
To simplify the analysis the number of battlefields ni is assumed to be arbitrarily large.
(However, the total value of each Colonel Blotto game φi = nivi is held constant.) Thus, the
number of different regions collapses from 64 to 4, which are given by 2
ni
≤
X ti
XAi ≤ 1 and
2
ni
≤
XAi
X ti
≤ 1 for each Colonel Blotto game Gi, i = 1,2. For given post-transfer levels of resources
of players 1 and 2, X t1 and X t2 respectively, player A’s payoffs in each Colonel Blotto game are
shown in Figure 3 below.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
11
Player A’s optimal second stage allocation of resources between the two Colonel Blotto
games is determined by the marginal payoffs in each Colonel Blotto game. In particular, there
are four qualitatively distinct cases of optimal resource allocations for player A. These corre-
spond to the four distinct regions of (X ti ,X t−i) pairs illustrated in Figure 4.
Case 1 Suppose φiφ−i >
max
{
(X ti )
2
,1
}
X ti X
t
−i
or 1 > X ti and
φi
φ−i =
1
X ti X
t
−i
. Then player A allocates all of
his resources to Colonel Blotto game Gi.
In Case 1, each unit of resource that player A allocates to the Colonel Blotto game Gi has a
marginal payoff that is higher than the first unit allocated to G−i. If the initial endowments X01 ,
X02 are such that this case holds, it is clear that there can be no nonzero net transfer that strictly
improves upon the allocation for both players, since player −i cannot do strictly better.
Case 2 Suppose φiφ−i >
X ti
X t−i
and 0 < 1 −
(φiX ti X t−i
φ−i
) 1
2
≤ X t−i. Then player A allocates
XAi =
(φiX ti X t−i
φ−i
) 1
2
to Colonel Blotto game Gi and XA(−i) = 1−
(φiX ti X t−i
φ−i
) 1
2
to Colonel Blotto
game G−i.
In Case 2, A’s budget is sufficiently large that it is optimal to allocate a level of resources greater
than X ti to the Blotto game Gi, XAi > X ti , thereby hitting the range of diminishing returns (see
Figure 3). At the margin A equates the return to an extra unit of resource allocated to game Gi to
the constant marginal return that he receives for allocating XA(−i) < X t−i. That is
φ−i
2X t−i
=
φiX ti
2(XAi)2
(see Figure 3), yielding XAi =
(φiX ti X t−i
φ−i
) 1
2
. Player A’s remaining forces 0 < 1−
(φiX ti X t−i
φ−i
) 1
2
< X t−i
are allocated to the remaining Colonel Blotto game, G−i.
Case 3 Suppose φiφ−i ≥
X ti
X t−i
and 1 −
(φiX ti X t−i
φ−i
) 1
2
> X t−i. Then player A allocates
XAi =
(φiX ti )
1
2
(φiX ti )
1
2 +(φ−iX t−i)
1
2
to Colonel Blotto game Gi and XA(−i) =
(φ−iX t−i)
1
2
(φiX ti )
1
2 +(φ−iX t−i)
1
2
to Colonel
Blotto game G−i.
In Case 3 player A has a sufficient level of resources to be able to set the marginal payoffs from
the two Colonel Blotto games equal at levels greater than the corresponding resource levels of
players 1 and 2. In particular, player A chooses XAi and XA(−i) such that
φ−iX t−i
2(XA(−i))
2 =
φiX ti
2(XAi)2
(see
Figure 3).
Case 4 Suppose φiφ−i =
X ti
X t−i
and 1 ≤ X01 +X02 . Then any pair (XA1,XA2) such that XA1 +XA2 = 1
and XAi ≤ X ti , i = 1,2 is an optimal response of player A.
In Case 4 any allocation by player A in which XAi ≤ X ti , i = 1,2 sets the marginal payoffs from
the two Colonel Blotto Games equal. As is shown in Section 5, if players 1 and 2 had the ability
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to commit to binding agreements and 1 ≤ X01 + X02 , then the transfer, t, which sets
φi
φ−i =
X ti
X t−i
maximizes the sum of the two players’ payoffs. Thus, it is clear that in Case 4 there can be no
nonzero net transfer that strictly improves upon the allocation for both players.
Figure 4 illustrates the ranges of
(
X ti ,X t−i
)
pairs corresponding to the cases described above
for values of φi and φ−i such that φiφ−i ≥ 1. The analysis is analogous when
φi
φ−i < 1.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
We now determine when there exists a nonzero transfer t from player 1 to player 2 that
strictly Pareto improves upon their initial endowments of the resource. The primitives at this
stage are the
(
X t1,X
t
2
)
-contingent subgame payoffs arising when player A optimally responds as
detailed in Cases 1 through 4 above, and the resulting Colonel Blotto game payoffs are given
as in Theorem 1, part (A).
By definition a self–enforcing alliance without commitment exists if and only if there exists
a t 6= 0 such that
pi ti
(
X ti ,XAi
(
X t1,X
t
2
))
> pi0i
(
X0i ,XAi
(
X01 ,X
0
2
))
in each of the respective games Gi, i = 1,2.
Clearly if the initial resource endowments
(
X01 ,X
0
2
)
satisfy the conditions of Case 1, then
there is no incentive for a non-zero transfer to take place (player −i is already receiving his
highest feasible payoff).9 The following two propositions examine alliance formation when the
initial resource endowments satisfy the conditions of Cases 2 and 3, respectively.
Proposition 1 Suppose
(
X01 ,X
0
2
)
satisfies the conditions of Case 2. Then a self–enforcing al-
liance without commitment exists in which player −i transfers a net positive level of resources
to player i if and only if
X0i +X
0
−i > 2
(
φ−iX0i
φiX0−i
) 1
2
.
No self–enforcing alliance exists in which player i transfers a positive net level of resources.
Proof With the initial endowments satisfying the conditions of Case 2, player A’s optimal al-
location of forces between the two Blotto games is determined by φ−i2X0−i
=
φiX0i
2(XAi)2
, and thus
9 While our focus is on alliance transfers that strictly benefit both alliance members, it is
instructive to note that in the portion of the Case 1 region in which 1 ≤ X0i or 1 > X0i andφi
φ−i 6=
1
X0i X
0
−i
, player −i is indifferent between keeping his endowment and making a transfer to
player i that leaves the endowment pair within the region, whereas player i prefers to accept
any such transfer.
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XAi =
(φiX01 X02φ−i
) 1
2
and XA(−i) = 1−
(φiX01 X02φ−i
) 1
2
. Given player A’s optimal stage 2 allocation of
resources between the two Colonel Blotto games with no transfers, player i’s payoff is
pi0i
(
X0i ,XAi
(
X01 ,X
0
2
))
=
1
2
(
φiφ−iX0i
X0−i
) 1
2
and player −i’s payoff is
pi0−i
(
X0−i,XA(−i)
(
X01 ,X
0
2
))
= φ−i− φ−i2X0−i
+
1
2
(
φiφ−iX0i
X0−i
) 1
2
.
Note that any positive net transfers τ from i to−i would result in the pair
(
X t1,X
t
2
)
satisfying
the conditions of Case 2 ( φi2X0i −2τ increases while
φ−i
2X0−i+2τ
decreases), and that in this case player
A’s optimal allocation of forces between the two Blotto games is determined by φ−i2X0−i+2τ
=
φi(X0i −τ)
2(XAi)2
. Thus player i’s payoff from such a transfer is
piτi
(
X0i − τ,XAi
(
X0i − τ,X
0
−i + τ
))
=
1
2
(
φiφ−i
(
X0i − τ
)(
X0−i + τ
)
) 1
2
.
It follows immediately that since ∂pi
τ
i
∂τ < 0 for all feasible positive net transfers τ , it is clear that
any nonzero strictly Pareto improving transfer must be from player −i to player i. Furthermore,
it is also clear that any such transfer of resources from player −i could not result in the pair(
X t1,X
t
2
)
satisfying the conditions of Case 3 or Case 2 with φ−iX0−i−τ
> φiX0i +τ
(i.e. the roles reversed)
since in both cases player −i would be worse off. Thus we can restrict our attention to alliance
transfers from player −i to player i in which the resulting levels of resources remain in the
current Case 2.
If a positive net transfer, τ , of resources from player −i to player i takes place, resulting in
an allocation that remains in Case 2, player A’s optimal allocation of forces between the two
Blotto games is determined by the marginal condition φ−i2X0−i−2τ
=
φi(X0i +τ)
2(XAi)2
and thus player i’s
payoff is
piτi
(
X0i + τ,XAi
(
X0i + τ,X
0
−i− τ
))
=
1
2
(
φiφ−i
(
X0i + τ
)(
X0−i− τ
)
) 1
2
and player −i’s payoff is
piτ−i
(
X0−i− τ,XA(−i)
(
X0i + τ,X0−i− τ
))
=
φ−i− φ−i2X0−i−2τ +
1
2
(
φiφ−i(X0i +τ)
(X0−i−τ)
) 1
2
.
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Note that ∂pi
τ
i
∂τ =
(φiφ−i)1/2(X0i +X0−i)
4(X0−i−τ)
3/2
(X0i +τ)
1/2 , which is positive for all τ . Thus player i is always willing
to accept a transfer τ > 0. It is straightforward to show that,
∂piτ−i
∂τ =−
φ−i
2
(
X0−i− τ
)2 + (φiφ−i)
1/2 (X0i +X0−i)
4
(
X0−i− τ
)3/2 (X0i + τ)1/2 .
Clearly, if ∂pi
τ
−i
∂τ |τ=0 > 0, a sufficiently small positive transfer would benefit −i as well. More-
over, it is straightforward to show that if ∂pi
τ
−i
∂τ |τ=0 ≤ 0 then
∂piτ−i
∂τ will remain nonpositive for all
τ > 0 such that τ < X0−i. Hence player −i will strictly benefit from a positive transfer to player
i if and only if ∂pi
τ
−i
∂τ |τ=0 > 0. This holds if and only if X
0
i +X
0
−i > 2
(
φ−iX0i
φiX0−i
) 1
2
. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 Suppose
(
X01 ,X
0
2
)
satisfies the conditions of Case 3. Then a self–enforcing al-
liance without commitment exists in which player −i transfers a net positive level of resources
to player i if and only if
1−
X0i
X0−i
> 2
(
φ−iX0i
φiX0−i
) 1
2
No self–enforcing alliance exists in which player i transfers a positive net level of resources.
Proof With the initial endowments satisfying the conditions of Case 3, player A’s optimal al-
location of forces between the two Blotto games is determined by φiX
0
i
2(XAi)2
=
φ−iX0−i
2(XA(−i))
2 , and thus
XA1 =
(φ1X01 )
1
2
(φ1X01 )
1
2 +(φ2X02 )
1
2
and XA2 =
(φ2X02 )
1
2
(φ1X01 )
1
2 +(φ2X02 )
1
2
. Given player A’s optimal stage 2 allocation
of forces between the two Colonel Blotto games player i’s, i = 1,2, payoff with a zero transfer
is
pi0i
(
X0i ,XAi
(
X01 ,X
0
2
))
=
φi
2

X0i +
(
φ−iX0i X0−i
φi
) 1
2

 .
If a positive net transfer, τ > 0, of resources from player −i to player i takes place, it is
feasible that the resulting allocation may remain in Case 3 or may switch to Case 2. First
looking at transfers within Case 3, player A’s optimal allocation of resources between the two
Blotto games is determined by the marginal condition φi(X
0
i −τ)
2(XAi)2
=
φ−i(X0−i+τ)
2(XA(−i))
2 . Hence, player
−i’s payoff is given by
piτ−i
(
X0−i− τ,XA(−i)
(
X0i + τ,X0−i− τ
))
=
φ−i
2
(
X0−i− τ +
(
φi(X0−i−τ)(X0i +τ)
φ−i
) 1
2
)
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and player i’s payoff follows directly. Clearly if ∂pi
τ
−i
∂τ |τ=0 > 0 a sufficiently small positive trans-
fer would benefit −i, and if ∂pi
τ
i
∂τ |τ=0 > 0 a sufficiently small transfer would benefit i. Moreover,
it is straightforward to show that if ∂pi
τ
−i
∂τ |τ=0 ≤ 0 then
∂piτ−i
∂τ will remain nonpositive for all τ > 0
such that τ < X0−i. In addition, for all τ ,
∂piτi
∂τ >
∂piτ−i
∂τ . Hence within the range of transfers that
remain in Case 3, both players 1 and 2 will strictly benefit from a net positive transfer from
player −i to player i if and only if ∂pi
τ
−i
∂τ |τ=0 > 0.
It is straightforward to show that
∂piτ−i
∂τ =
φ−i
2

−1+ 1
2
( φi
φ−i
) 1
2 X0−i−X0i −2τ((
X0−i− τ
)(
X0i + τ
)) 1
2

 .
Thus, there exists a strictly Pareto improving transfer τ > 0, from −i to i, that remains in the
range of allocations covered by Case 3 if and only if X
0
−i−X
0
i
(X0i X
0
−i)
1
2
> 2
(φ−i
φi
) 1
2
. We claim that this
is also a necessary condition for the existence of a strictly Pareto improving transfer from −i to
i that switches to Case 2. This results from the fact that the subset of Case 2 allocations where
∂piτ−i
∂τ |τ=0 > 0 (delineated in Proposition 1) may be reached through a transfer from −i to i only
if the initial Case 3 allocation satisfies the condition of Proposition 2.
A similar condition holds for player i. In examining transfers τ > 0 from i to −i, ∂pi
τ
i
∂τ |τ=0 >
0 is equivalent to X
0
i −X
0
−i
(X0i X
0
−i)
1
2
> 2
( φi
φ−i
) 1
2
. However, no initial endowment in which φiφ−i ≥
X0i
X0−i
satisfies this constraint. Thus, player i never offers a positive net transfer to player −i that
results in an allocation in Case 3. As shown in Proposition 1, once in Case 2 player i also never
offers a positive net transfer to player −i. It follows directly that given an initial endowment
in Case 3 there exists no strictly Pareto improving positive net transfer from player i to player
−i that crosses over into Case 2. Thus, player i never offers a positive net transfer to player −i.
Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that there are several ranges of parameters in which en-
dogenous unilateral transfers take place. That is, a self–enforcing alliance without commitment
forms. The set of (X0i ,X0−i) pairs for which such an alliance forms is illustrated in Figure 5 for
the case in which XA = 1. The (X0i ,X0−i) pairs satisfying the conditions of Cases 2 or 3 and lying
in the region above and to the left of the bold lines are the initial endowments for which these
alliances arise.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
As is evident from Figure 5 and the inequalities that determine this region in the statements
of the two propositions, self–enforcing alliances without commitment form only when players
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1 and 2 have sufficiently asymmetric endowments both in absolute terms and relative to the
corresponding values of their Blotto games. In particular, in the region of endowments corre-
sponding to Case 3, the boundary delineating the set of endowments for which these alliances
form is linear (see Figure 5). Throughout this region, self–enforcing alliances without commit-
ment form if and only if the ratio of the initial endowments X
0
−i
X0i
exceeds a constant threshold,
which is greater than max{1, φ−iφi }. This insures that alliance transfers only flow from player−i,
the player with the higher endowment, to player i, the player with the lower endowment and
only if the ratio of their endowments X
0
−i
X0i
exceeds the ratio of Blotto game values φ−iφi .
In the region of endowments corresponding to Case 2, the boundary of the set of endow-
ments for which these alliances form is concave in X0i . Within this region, as the sum of the
endowments, X0i + X0−i, increases, the threshold value of
X0−i
X0i
above which alliances form de-
creases. When φ−iφi < 1, as in panel (a) of Figure 5, the boundary of the set of endowments for
which these alliances form intersects the boundary of the region corresponding to Case 1 along
the 45◦ line. One consequence (as is illustrated in Figure 5, panel (a)) is that there exist param-
eter configurations for which self–enforcing alliances without commitment arise even though
the initial endowments are arbitrarily close to equality. When φ−iφi > 1, as in panel (b) of Figure
5, the boundary of this set intersects the line X t−i =
φ−i
φi X
t
i before it reaches the boundary of
the Case 1 region. Indeed, from the condition provided in Proposition 2, this happens precisely
when X0i +X0−i = 2. One consequence, (as is illustrated in Figure 5, panel (b)) is that there ex-
ist parameter configurations for which self–enforcing alliances without commitment arise even
though the ratio of the initial endowments X
0
−i
X0i
is arbitrarily close to the ratio of Blotto game
values φ−iφi .
10 Finally, as in the region of endowments corresponding to Case 3, for Case 2 en-
dowments alliance transfers always flow from player−i, the player with the higher endowment,
to player i, the player with the lower endowment, and only if the ratio of their endowments X
0
−i
X0i
exceeds the ratio of Blotto game values φ−iφi .
In this sense, the nature of transfers in our model conform to a version of the “exploitation
hypothesis”. When self–enforcing alliances without commitment form, transfers flow from the
player who is resource rich to the player who is resource poor, both in absolute terms and
relative to the total value at stake in their respective Colonel Blotto games with player A.
Moreover, when self–enforcing alliances without commitment form, it must be the case that
the combination of direct and strategic effects of the unilateral transfer benefits both allies.
Clearly, since the direct effect harms the player making the transfer and benefits the player re-
ceiving the transfer, it must be the case that the strategic effect benefits the transferring player
10 This holds for initial endowments which are (1) above the line X t−i = φ−iφi X ti and (2) satisfy
2 ≤ X0−i +X0i ≤ 1+
φ−i
φi .
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and harms the receiving player (if player A moves resources away from the game of the trans-
ferring player, these resources flow to the game with the receiving player). In this context, it is
interesting to identify the source of a breakdown of the existence of self–enforcing alliances
without commitment, that is, whether it is the relatively resource poor ally who declines to re-
ceive a transfer or the relatively rich ally who declines to initiate the transfer. The details of
the proofs of these two Propositions indicate that it is always the resource rich ally whose in-
centive constraint binds first. That is, the region where such alliances form is bounded by the
willingness of the player making the transfer.
5 Alliances with Complete Commitment
As a benchmark for the analysis of self–enforcing alliances without commitment, it is useful
to examine the nature of ex ante transfers that would arise between players 1 and 2 if complete
and binding commitments could be made concerning the ex post division of payoffs. We call
alliances in which such commitment can be made alliances with complete commitment.
In the presence of complete and binding commitments an optimal ex ante transfer solves
max
t
pi t1
(
X t1,XA1
(
X t1,X
t
2
))
+pi t2
(
X t2,XA2
(
X t1,X
t
2
))
In Proposition 3 we show that an optimal transfer leads to an outcome in which X t−i =
φ−i
φi X
t
i .
Hence, unless the initial endowments satisfy X0−i =
φ−i
φi X
0
i nonzero transfers of resource endow-
ments will always take place.11
Proposition 3 Let ˆX = X01 +X02 . In any alliance with complete commitment, the allocation of
the alliance budget to the two Colonel Blotto games is X ti =
ˆXφi
φi+φ−i and X
t
−i =
ˆXφ−i
φi+φ−i . Thus, the
alliance transfers result in φiφ−i =
X ti
X t−i
. If X0−i = φ−iφi X0i , then no transfers take place.
Proof We begin with the case that ˆX ≥ 1. Thus, in the alliance with complete commitment, the
allocation of the alliance budget to the two Colonel Blotto games may satisfy the conditions for
Case 1, Case 2, or Case 4 (see Figure 4). Clearly, any allocation by the alliance that satisfies
the conditions for Case 1 is not an equilibrium strategy. In Case 1 the alliance wins all of the
battlefields in Blotto game −i and player A allocates zero resources to Blotto game −i. Thus,
the alliance can strictly increase its payoff by diverting resources from the Blotto game −i to
the Blotto game i up until the point at which φiφ−i =
X ti
X t−i
, as in Case 4, or 0 < 1− (φiX
t
i X
t
−i
φ−i )
1
2 , as
in Case 2.
11 We abstract away from issues concerning the precise ex post division of the alliance’s joint
payoff. For cooperative game theoretic approaches to the theory of alliance costs and benefits
see Sandler (1999) and Arce M. and Sandler (2001).
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Similarly, any allocation by the alliance that satisfies the conditions for Case 2 is not an
equilibrium strategy. In particular note that in Case 2 the joint payoff of the alliance, piτ12 ≡ piτ1 +
piτ2 , given any allocation, (X0i ,X0−i) in Case 2 and any transfer τ > 0 such that
X0i +τφi <
X0−i−τ
φ−i , is
given by
piτ12
(
X0i + τ,X
0
−i− τ
)
=
piτi
(
X0i + τ,XAi
(
X0i + τ,X
0
−i− τ
))
+piτ−i
(
X0−i− τ,XA(−i)
(
X0i + τ,X
0
−i− τ
))
.
In Case 2 this equals φ−i− φ−i2(X0−i−τ) +
(
φiφ−i(X0i +τ)
X0−i−τ
) 1
2
. It follows directly that ∂pi
τ
12
∂τ > 0 for all
τ > 0 such that X
0
i +τφi <
X0−i−τ
φ−i . Thus, the alliance can strictly increase its payoff by diverting
resources from Blotto game −i to Blotto game i up until the point at which φiφ−i =
X ti
X t−i
, as in
Case 4.
In Case 4, the payoff to the alliance is (φ1 +φ2)
(
1− 12 ˆX
)
. Given the arguments given above
concerning Cases 1 and 2, it is clear that their are no profitable deviations for the alliance.
Lastly, in the case of an alliance with complete commitment and ˆX < 1, the allocation of
the alliance budget to the two Colonel Blotto games may satisfy the conditions for Case 2 or
Case 3 (see Figure 4). Given the above arguments, any allocation by the alliance that satisfies
the conditions for Case 2 is not an equilibrium strategy. In Case 3 the payoff of the alliance
given any initial allocation,
(
X0i ,X
0
−i
)
in Case 3 and any transfer τ > 0 such that X
0
i +τφi ≤
X0−i−τ
φ−i ,
is given by
piτ12
(
X0i + τ,X
0
−i− τ
)
=
φi(X0i +τ)
2 +
φ−i(X0−i−τ)
2 +
(φiφ−i(X0−i− τ)(X0i + τ)) 12 .
It follows directly that
∂piτ12
∂τ =
φi
2
−
φ−i
2
+
1
2
(
φiφ−i(X0−i− τ)
X0i + τ
) 1
2
−
1
2
(
φiφ−i(X0i + τ)
X0−i− τ
) 1
2
.
Solving for τ yields φiφ−i =
X0i +τ
X0−i−τ
, and thus X ti =
ˆXφi
φi+φ−i and X
t
−i =
ˆXφ−i
φi+φ−i . Q.E.D.
In contrast to the restricted range of initial endowments for which transfers take place in
self–enforcing alliances without commitment, such transfers take place almost everywhere un-
der alliances with complete commitment. Only when X0−i =
φ−i
φi X
0
i does no transfer take place.
However, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 5, there exist initial endowments for which a self–
enforcing alliance without commitment yields the same outcome as under complete commit-
ment, X t−i =
φ−i
φi X
t
i . This arises for a subset of the range of endowments in which the alliance
member (−i in the figure), with the higher Colonel Blotto game value (φ−i) has an endowment,
X0−i, both larger than that of player A and larger than the product of the ratio of game values
and the alliance partner’s endowment (φ−iφi X0i ).
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Of course these two types of alliances form the two endpoints of the entire spectrum of pos-
sible levels of commitment. However, one might conjecture that intermediate levels of commit-
ment generate regions of initial endowments where nonzero transfers take place that are nested
between the regions corresponding to these two extremes.
6 Conclusion
The literature on the economics of alliances, originating with Olson (1965) and Olson and
Zeckhauser (1966) focuses on the case where defense expenditures are a (possibly impure)
public good and the threat of attack is exogenous. This paper extends this literature by examin-
ing the formation of self–enforcing alliances without commitment in a multi-player, multi-front
Colonel Blotto game. In this case, the payoff to each alliance member is completely exclud-
able and rival. Moreover, the common opponent is able to observe and react to the formation
of the alliance and the resulting transfer of resources. Remarkably, we find that self–enforcing
alliances without commitment form for a wide range of parameters. With ex ante asymmetry
of resources — both in absolute terms and relative to the respective values at stake in the al-
lies’ Colonel Blotto games — unilateral transfers from the relatively resource-rich ally to the
relatively resource-poor ally cause a reallocation of the common opponent’s resources that ben-
efits both allies. For the ally making the transfer, the positive strategic effect of the opponent’s
reallocation of resources away from their Blotto game makes up for the negative direct effect
of the reduction in own resources. For the ally receiving the transfer, the positive direct effect
of greater resource availability dominates the negative strategic effect of a higher opponent
resource level.
Potential extensions of the model include the analysis of a more general network structure
of battlefield alignment in which players may be engaged in several conflicts with different
sets of adversaries, who may themselves be engaged in other conflicts. In this context, it is
possible to carry out a nontrivial examination of the nature of the alliances that form and the
composition of their membership. Our model also provides a useful tool for examining the
strategic effects of precommitment to budgetary transparency. Since the payoffs and strategies
in any Blotto game are parameterized by the players’ budgets, our model is a natural framework
for examining the costs and benefits of finer or coarser budgetary information and the effects
of budgetary aggregation and disaggregation in entities engaged in conflict. It may also serve
as a useful framework for the study of espionage.
Finally, although the analysis in this paper is framed in the context of military alliances, it is
readily adapted to other contexts. For instance, in the context of multiple-product R&D races
or patent races, it can be applied to explain research joint ventures and silent cross-industry
20
partnerships (“cash infusions”) between firms that do not compete in the same market, but face
a common conglomerate competitor.
References
1. Arce M., D. G., and T. Sandler (2001) A cooperative game theory of noncontiguous allies,
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3, 391-411.
2. Herring, G. C. Jr. (1973) Aid to Russia 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the
Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.
3. Linster, B.G. (1993) A rent-seeking model of international competition and alliances, De-
fense Economics, 4, 213-226.
4. Murdoch, J. C., and T. Sandler (1982) A theoretical and empirical analysis of NATO, Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution, 26, 237-263.
5. Murdoch, J. C., and T. Sandler (1984) Complementarity, free riding, and the military ex-
penditures of NATO allies, Journal of Public Economics, 25, 83-101.
6. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
7. Olson, M., and R. Zeckhauser (1966) An economic theory of alliances, Review of Eco-
nomic Statistics, 48, 266-279.
8. Roberson, B. (2006) The Colonel Blotto game, Economic Theory, 29, 1-24.
9. Sandler, T. (1977) Impurity of defense: An application to the economics of alliances, Kyk-
los, 30, 443-460.
10. Sandler, T. (1999) Alliance formation, alliance expansion, and the core, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 43, 727-747.
11. Sandler, T., and J. Cauley (1975) On the economic theory of alliances, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 19, 330-348.
12. Sandler, T., and K. Hartley (2001) Economics of alliances: the lessons for collective action,
Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 869-896.
13. Skaperdas, S. (1998) On the formation of alliances in conflict and contests, Public Choice,
96, 25-42.
14. Van Ypersele De Strihou, J. (1967) Sharing the defense burden among Western allies,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 49, 527-536.
21
ﬃ
ﬂ ^
]
Player A
Player 1 Player 2
Blotto Game G1 Blotto Game G2
ﬀ
-
Alliance Transfers
Fig. 1 Coalitional Colonel Blotto Game Schematic
22
Strong Player’s Payoff
Weak Player’s Payoff
- X i
X i
6
pi j
nivi
1
1
2
1− 1
ni
1
ni
1− 2
n2i
2
n2i
12ni
1
ni−1
1
ni
Fig. 2 Payoffs in Colonel Blotto Game i
23
- X1A
6
pi1A
(
XA1|X t1
)
X t1 1
φ1
2
φ1
∂ pi1A
∂ XA1 =
φ1
2X t1
∂ pi1A
∂ XA1 =
φ1X t1
2(XA1)2
Colonel Blotto Game G1
- XA2
6
pi2A
(
XA2|X t2
)
X t2 1
φ2
φ2
2
∂ pi2A
∂ XA2 =
φ2
2X t2
∂ pi2A
∂ XA2 =
φ2X t2
2(XA2)2
Colonel Blotto Game G2
Fig. 3 Player A’s Payoffs in Each Colonel Blotto Game Given Players 1 and 2’s Resource Levels
24
- X ti
6
X t−i
1
2
φ−i
φi
1
1
2 1
φiφ−i
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

X t−i = X ti
X t−i =
φ−i
φi X
t
i
Fig. 4 Cases of A’s Optimal Resource Allocation ( φiφ−i > 1)
25
- X ti
6
X t−i
1
2
φ−i
φi
1
1
2 1
φiφ−i
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

X t−i = X
t
i
X t−i =
φ−i
φi X
t
i
Alliances
(a) φ−iφi < 1
- X ti
6
X t−i
1
2
φ−i
φi
1
1
2 1
φiφ−i
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

X t−i = X ti
X t−i =
φ−i
φi X
t
i
Alliances
(b) φ−iφi > 1
Fig. 5 Ranges of Alliance Formation
